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Does family ownership create or destroy value: Evidence from Canada 
Heng Du 
This study examines whether and how family ownership enhances or damages firm value 
using a sample of Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) 1999 
to 2007. We identify family companies as firms in which the founder or founding family 
hold more than 20 percent of outstanding shares and are the largest shareholders, or firms 
in which family members work as CEOs and/or serve as Chairman of the board of 
directors. In addition, we construct a sample of matching firms which are in the same 
industry, have a similar size as the family companies, and whose sales range within +/-
25 percent of the sales of family companies. We use Tobin's Q and return on asset 
(ROA), measured by either net income or EBITDA divided by total assets, as proxies of 
firm value. Our results suggest that family companies are generally superior to non-
family companies. In addition, we find that control-enhancing mechanisms which are 
often employed by family companies add values to companies. Furthermore, we find that 
agency conflicts between ownership and management are more costly than those between 
majority and minority shareholders, suggesting that family ownership helps resolve the 
agency conflicts between ownership and management and in turn enhances firm value. 
Finally, we find that family companies with founders as CEOs outperform those with 
descendants as CEOs. 
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Does family ownership create or destroy value: Evidence from Canada 
1. Introduction 
Family control is common in publicly traded firms (Burkart et al., 2003). It is one of 
the most prevalent forms of ownership structure all around the world, such as in the US, 
Canada, Western Europe, and Asia. Family companies also make great contributions to 
the economies in those countries. Family-founded companies in the U.S. account for one 
third of companies listed on the S&P 500 and for 18% of outstanding equities (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003). In Western Europe, the controlling power of most publicly traded firms 
retains within the founding family. According to Faccio and Lang (2002), 44% of 
Western European companies are controlled by families. Moreover, those controlling 
families often have executive representation. Even though founders are retired from 
managerial positions, their descendants continue to hold significant equity stakes and 
occupy senior manager positions in the companies (Burkart et al., 2003). 
Although there has been an extensive research on family controlled firms, the question 
remains largely unanswered whether family-concentrated ownership structures increase 
or decrease firm value relative to a diversified ownership structure. In the US, family 
firms tend to have higher valuations and profitability than non-family firms 
(McConaughy et al., 1998; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Villalonga and Amit (2004) find 
that the premiums of family-controlled companies are mainly attributed to founding 
family-CEOs. Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that gains from family control start to 
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disappear when the ownership stake exceeds 30%. In contrast to family premiums, 
Faccio et al. (2001) report that family control may harm minority shareholders by probing 
East Asian firms where the legal environment is weak. For Western Europe, it is 
assumed that family control should increase firm profitability, where value premiums 
should arise in such legal environments that succeed in protecting minority shareholders 
against the expropriation by majority shareholders. 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance in Canadian companies. Our sample consists of firms listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX) between 1999 and 2007. We follow Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
and define family companies as those in which the largest shareholder is the founding 
family and holds more than 20% of outstanding shares, or in which the CEO and/or the 
chairman of the board of directors comes from the founding family. For comparison 
purposes, we construct a sample of matching firms which have the same two-digit SIC 
code, are of similar size, have sales lie within +/-25 percent of the sales of family 
companies, (see also McConaughy et al., 1998). We then examine whether family-run 
companies outperform non-family-run companies and whether potential performance 
differences between the two groups can be attributed to the firms' ownership structure. 
In general, we find that family companies outperform their non-family counterparts, 
even though Tobin's Q decreases as the ownership percentage increases. The mean value 
of Tobin's Q in family companies is higher than that in non-family firms. In addition, the 
average return on assets in family companies is significantly higher than that of non-
family firms, based on either net income or EBITDA. 
Second, we examine whether control-enhancing mechanisms contribute to firm value. 
Specifically, we focus our attention on firms with dual-class shares. This share structure 
is frequently viewed as one of the most important control-enhancing mechanisms as it 
aims to provide major shareholders excessive control rights over cash-flow rights (Faccio 
and Lang, 2002). Claessens et al. (2000) show that in most East Asian countries, the 
controlling families hold more voting rights than cash-flow rights through pyramid 
ownership structures and cross-ownership which protect their controlling status within 
the company. Findings from prior research suggest that family companies with a single 
class of shares perform no differently from non-family companies with respect to Tobin's 
Q, even though they are superior to widely held companies in terms of accounting 
profitability (King and Santor, 2008). However, family companies with control-
enhancing mechanisms, i.e. firms with dual-class shares, do worse than widely held 
companies in terms of their market performance, but have similar accounting 
performance, based on ROA, and have a similar level of financial leverage (Gompers et 
al., 2007; King and Santor, 2008). Our findings show that control-enhancing mechanisms 
add value to Canadian firms. Specifically, in our empirical analysis there is a significant 
and positive relationship between the presence of control-enhancing mechanisms and 
both Tobin's Q and ROA. However, if the controlling family holds more excessive 
voting rights, both Tobin's Q and ROA decrease dramatically. Theoretical studies 
suggest that family concentrated ownership structures help resolve the so-called Agency 
Problem I, i.e. the agency conflict between ownership and management, while Agency 
Problem II, i.e. the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders remains 
or is even exacerbated in family controlled companies (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
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Hence, whether family companies create or destroy value depends on the relative 
importance of agency costs related to these two types of agency problems. We find that 
Agency Problem I is more costly than Agency Problem II. Finally, we find that family-
CEOs are superior based on ROA, while family-Chairman is worse based on Tobin's Q. 
Such different influences on firm value can be attributed to the unclear effects of family 
management on firm performance. If the company is controlled and managed by its 
founding family, Agency Problem I can be mitigated. However, at the same time, 
Agency Problem II appears. On the other hand, if the family controlled company is 
managed by professional managers, Agency Problem II can be alleviated to some extent, 
Agency Problem I occurs, however. Hence, family managers can either positively or 
negatively affect firm value. Consistent with Villalonga and Amit (2006), we find that 
founder-CEOs are superior to descendant-CEOs. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews theories and empirical evidence 
in prior studies. Section 3 describe our sample and defines our variables, and while 
Section 4 describes our methodology. In Section 5, we provide and discuss our empirical 
results. Section 6, we provides concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Does family ownership create or destroy value? 
The question whether firms with concentrated ownership, more specifically, family 
concentrated ownership are as efficient as firms with diversified ownership structure has 
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been extensively studied in the financial literature. Yet, the empirical evidence is at most 
mixed. Anderson and Reeb (2003) state that concentrated ownership can facilitate 
operations and add value to the company as majority shareholders are encouraged to 
mitigate managerial expropriation. In addition, it is often argued that the presence of 
founding families in family companies, the large concentrated ownership in these 
companies, and the family's ability to exert significant influence on the decisions made 
by management and the board of directors place family owners in an extraordinary 
position to influence and monitor the firm. Besides the monitoring and controlling 
advantages enjoyed by family companies, families tend to have longer investment 
horizons compared to non-family companies, resulting in more efficient investments 
(James, 1999). In addition, Berle and Means (1932) note that concentrated ownership 
adds value to a company by releasing the conflicts between owners and managers. 
However, Demsetz (1983) argues that concentrated ownership has an insignificant 
influence on firm value in that it is endogenously decided by owners for profit 
maximization purposes. This later view is also supported by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
2.7.7 Advantages and disadvantages of concentrated ownership 
Andres (2008) argues that the effect of concentrated ownership on firm value is 
uncertain in that large shareholders may act either in the best interest of the company or 
in the best interest of themselves and expropriate minority shareholders to maximize their 
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own utility. The empirical results in the literature fail to provide unambiguous evidence 
regarding the impact of concentrated ownership on firm performance, however. 
There are two types of agency conflicts associated with a concentrated ownership 
structure. The first describes the agency conflicts between owners and management, and 
is referred to as Agency problem I (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
This agency problem, which is inherent in companies with separated owners and 
managers, can be mitigated by monitoring. The presence of a powerful controlling 
shareholder helps exert monitoring on management and can thus reduce the severity of 
this agency problem. In contrast, in widely-held firms, prior researchers have identified a 
free-rider problem (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Holmstrom, 1982). Specifically, they 
argue that small shareholders are not willing to contribute their personal resources to 
supervising managers as the cost of doing so may outweigh their benefits and because 
they believe that other shareholders may monitor managers on their behalf. At the same 
time, large blockholders holding large stakes in the company are willing to put more 
effort into monitoring managers. Hence, concentrated ownership provides a solution for 
the free-rider problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), and the associated agency problem. 
In addition to the reduced agency costs, managers face the risk that they may be removed 
by large shareholders with great voting power, if they do not manage the company in the 
best interest of those shareholders. Hence, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that large 
shareholders have not only the incentives to decrease agency costs and hence improve 
firm performance, but that they have the actual power to do so as well, when compared 
with small shareholders. 
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The second agency conflict arises in situations in which controlling shareholders work 
in the best interest of themselves and expropriate minority shareholders to maximize their 
own utility. This conflict is often referred to as Agency Problem II (Berle and Means, 
1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The conflict arises because large shareholders may 
maximize their private benefits at the expense of small shareholders. When the voting 
rights owned by large shareholders exceed the cash flow rights, the probability of 
extraction from small shareholders is particularly high (Faccio et al., 2001). 
Consequently, large shareholders are likely to distribute a large sum of cash flows to 
themselves, rather than to expand the company or distribute to all shareholders. 
2.1.2 Advantages and disadvantages of family ownership 
It is often argued that family ownership is superior to other ownership structures. First 
of all, like other large shareholders, family shareholders have strong incentives to spend 
time and money on monitoring managers to reduce agency costs and improve firm 
performance. In addition, the incentives of family shareholders are stronger than those of 
other large shareholders since they invest their private wealth in the company, and 
because they are not well diversified (Andres, 2008). Thus, family shareholders are more 
concerned about firm performance and have a stronger incentive to monitor managers. 
Second, families may know the market and the company better due to their long-term 
presence at the company and because knowledge and technologies are passed from 
generation to generation. Moreover, their long-time presence in the company may result 
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in a good relationship with employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and outside 
shareholders. Ward (1988) indicates that the turnover rate and recruitment costs are 
lower in family companies than in widely held companies, resulting from better working 
environments, as well as a stronger trust and higher level of loyalty from employees. The 
reputation built by the family through the long presence in the company may facilitate the 
relationship with customers, suppliers and creditors. According to Anderson et al. (2003), 
the owners' long-term commitment and the fewer conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders in family companies lead to a lower cost of debt. Moreover, the long-term 
presence of family owners may facilitate raising money from investors, since financiers 
are more willing to invest in companies that focus on long-run profit maximization 
instead of the maximization of short-run profits. Consequently, family ownership is 
superior to other ownership structures to the extent that it allows for the better correlation 
of trust and loyalty between majority owners, i.e. the families, and employees, customers, 
suppliers, creditors and outside shareholders, (Tagiuri and Davis, 1996). 
Third, as briefly noted above, investment decisions made in family companies are 
typically made for long-term profit maximization purposes, rather than for short-term 
profit maximization (James, 1999). Stein (1988), for example, develops a model that 
indicates that the investment horizons in family companies are longer than those in non-
family companies. He argues that family companies are not likely to sacrifice long run 
profits to boost current earnings. Hence, family companies make more efficient 
investment decisions than widely held companies. 
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Finally, family companies are more productive than non-family companies. 
Martikainen et al. (2008) suggest that the production output is higher for family 
companies than for non-family companies. The higher firm value and profitability of 
family companies are attributed to the higher production efficiency of family companies. 
2.1.3 Disadvantages of family ownership 
On the downside, family ownership is also associated with potential costs and 
disadvantages. First of all, family shareholders may choose to maximize their own 
benefits instead of maximizing firm value, and hence, expropriate minority shareholders 
(Faccio et al., 2001). Moreover, La Porta et al. (1999) find that the regulations and laws 
to protect minority shareholders from the expropriation by large shareholders are 
insufficient in many countries, even in developed countries. Claessens et al. (2000) show 
that family ownership is the most prevalent form of ownership structure in East Asian 
countries, where regulations to protect minority shareholders are weak. Those firms are 
more willing to employ a pyramid ownership structure and cross-ownership, which lead 
to more voting rights in excess of cash-flow rights, to secure their managerial controlling 
status. 
Second, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) introduce the term "amenity potential", which 
refers to non-pecuniary private benefits of control. They argue that decisions made by 
the entrenched family may be sub-optimal. In order to enhance their control over the 
company, the family may appoint a family member as CEO or as a member of the board 
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of directors rather than outsiders, though the latter may be more competent. The sub-
optimal selection of managers negatively affects firm value. Family companies are more 
likely to use control-enhancing mechanisms, which exacerbate the expropriation from 
minority shareholders to maximize majority shareholders' personal utility (Lease et al., 
1984). In addition, Barclay and Holderness (1989) argue that as a consequence of family 
entrenchment, the probability of bidding by outside investors may be reduced, leading to 
a lower market value. In line with those arguments, the authors find that there is a 
negative relationship between firm performance and firm age. 
Third, as discussed above, because family shareholders are typically large and poorly 
diversified investors, they tend to employ less risky investment and financing strategies. 
The excessive use of risk-averse investment strategies can be attributed to the desire to 
secure the family legacy passed from generation to generation. In order to reduce the risk, 
family companies are likely to diversify by investing in businesses that fall outside the 
core business of the company. Minority shareholders may not benefit from their 
diversification strategy, however, as they may be able to diversify on an individual basis. 
Another way in which family companies often reduce risk is by using less debt, leading 
to the loss of potential tax shields and hampering the company's ability to raise funds. 
Both of those risk reduction strategies negatively affect firm value. In contrast to those 
arguments, however, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find a similar debt to equity ratio and a 
lower level of diversification in family companies relative to non-family companies. 
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2.2 Definition of a family firm 
There is no clear definition of a family firm. In the literature, researchers use different 
definitions to identify family firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit 
(2006), for example, define family companies as those where a family member holds a 
managerial position, such as officer, director, or those where the founding family holds at 
least 5% of the company's ownership. Saito (2008) defines family companies as firms 
which are controlled by the founding family and in which managerial positions are 
occupied by family members. He selects companies where the CEO or the Chairman of 
the board of directors is a family member and/or the founding family is the largest 
shareholder in the firm. In order to investigate how management succession affects firm 
value, Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) examine actively managed family firms that are 
companies where the family holds the largest block of voting rights and holds at least 
10% of voting shares, and the managerial positions are controlled by the family. Andres 
(2008) defines family companies as those where the founding family holds at least 25% 
of voting rights or those where founding family members serve as the CEOs or as 
Chairmen of the board of directors. 
2.3 Does the use of control-enhancing mechanisms improve firm performance? 
King and Santor (2008) argue that the inconclusive results in the literature of how 
family ownership is associated with firm value are due to the inability to capture the 
effects of excessive voting rights over cash-flow rights. They conclude that the 
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underperformance of family companies is due to the use of control-enhancing 
mechanisms, instead of the family ownership structure. They find that the size of the 
wedge, which is referred to as the difference between families' voting rights and cash-
flow rights, is negatively associated with market performance (Conqvist and Nilsson, 
2003; Lins, 2003; Gompers et al., 2007). 
By issuing different classes of shares, which is one of the mechanisms to enhance 
control, ownership can differ from controlling power. According to Claessens et al. 
(2002), family firms are more likely to employ control enhancing mechanisms than their 
non-family counterparts. In order to maintain their controlling positions and their 
interests within the company, a family may employ certain ways to enhance their voting 
rights, thus the control-enhancing mechanisms. The use of control-enhancing 
mechanisms, such as dual-class shares or pyramids, may raise the control of the family 
over the company dramatically. The most common method employed by families in this 
context is the use of dual-class shares. Generally, the class of shares with greater voting 
rights per share is held by the family, while the class of shares with relatively fewer 
voting rights per share is owned by outside shareholders. 
According to Villalonga and Amit (2006), 50% of the family companies in their 
sample use some form of control-enhancing mechanism which entitles them to a 
proportion of the total voting rights exceeding their ownership stakes. In addition, they 
find that family companies tend to employ more control-enhancing mechanisms than 
non-family companies. This is also supported by the recent findings of King and Santor 
(2008). They indicate that 87% of the companies using control-enhancing mechanisms 
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are family companies. In their study, the authors find that the voting rights held by 
families exceed their actual shareholdings by an average of 17%. Furthermore, they find 
that shareholder values are lower when the family employs control-enhancing 
mechanisms in that the value being proportional to the excess of voting rights over cash 
flow rights is decreased (see also Villalonga and Amit, 2006). King and Santor further 
observe that the use of dual-class shares leads to a lower Tobin's Q. On average, the 
Tobin's Q of the companies with control-enhancing mechanisms is 0.367 lower than the 
mean value of those without control-enhancing mechanisms, and there is no significant 
effect on ROA. Gompers et al. (2007) find an insignificant relationship between the use 
of control-enhancing mechanisms and firm value. According to Villalonga and Amit 
(2006), minority shareholders in family companies are neither worse nor better off than 
those in non-family companies. Moreover, even if both founder-CEO and descendant-
CEO managed companies with control-enhancing mechanisms outperform non-family 
companies, such mechanisms produce more value in founder-CEO family companies. 
2.4 Agency theory 
Agency theory, which highlights interest conflicts within organizations, is a major 
concern in corporate governance research. The so called Agency Problem I, which 
describes the conflicts between owners and managers, can be alleviated if there are large 
shareholders because those shareholders have greater incentives to supervise managers. 
On the other hand, Agency Problem II refers to the agency conflict between large 
shareholders and small shareholders. It is generally assumed that large shareholders may 
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use their controlling power to provide benefits to themselves at the expense of smaller 
shareholders. The Agency Problem II can be relieved to some extent if the large 
shareholder is an institution or a widely held company, but even then the incentive to 
monitor management will be reduced at the same time. 
2.4.1 Agency costs in family firms 
As stated by Andres (2008), founding families have strong incentives to decrease 
agency problems and increase firm value. Andres argues that the incentives to both 
monitor management and expropriate from minority shareholders are greater in family-
controlled companies than in non-family companies. If a single individual and/or his 
family own the firm, Agency Problem I may be reduced or eliminated, while Agency 
Problem II remains (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Furthermore, 
which of these two agency problems is more costly is still an open question. Morck et al. 
(1988), Palia and Ravid (2002) and Fahlenbrach (2004) find higher firm valuation in 
founder-controlled family companies, while Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) and Perez-
Gonzalez (2001) find contrary results. 
In many family companies, the controlling family tends to occupy managerial 
positions. On one hand, combining ownership with management provides benefits in that 
family-managers have more incentives to improve firm performance. In addition, Leland 
and Pyle (1977) suggest that the extent of information asymmetries between managers 
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and minor shareholders may be reduced, as the percentage of shares held by family-
managers serves as a signal of the quality of the company. 
On the other hand, majority shareholders maximize their personal benefits by 
expropriating from minority shareholders. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) examines 500 US 
companies and finds that the stock prices increase substantially when professional CEOs 
are appointed after the retirement or resignation of a family-CEO. Moreover, the extent 
of expropriation of majority shareholders from minority shareholders is affected by the 
legal environment. Burkart et al. (2003) find that founding families are more willing to 
retain control within the family when the regulations to protect minority shareholders are 
weak. This is also supported by the findings of Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and 
Lang (2002) who find that family ownership is dominant in both Asia and Continental 
Europe where, the protection of minority shareholders is generally weak. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that corporate diversification is of importance in 
assessing the agency problems between shareholders and managers. Diversification 
strategies are deemed as ineffective corporate governance means in that they are believed 
to facilitate management entrenchment and expropriation (Rose and Shepard, 1997; 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency 
problems are caused by the insufficient compensation provided to managers. In order to 
seek additional compensations, managers may employ non-compensatory means such as 
free-riding or shirking, which are harmful to shareholders. Moreover, managers could 
take advantages of information asymmetries to commit frauds. On the other hand, by 
monitoring managers, shareholders can, to some extent, release such problems (Schulze 
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et al., 2001). Therefore, due to the reduced likelihood and severity of such information 
asymmetries, agency problems are less severe in family controlled companies (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The cost to reducing information asymmetries is the lowest in 
family companies, in that family members are involved in management (Tsai et al., 2006; 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), on one hand, family controlled companies are 
superior to non-family companies due to more efficient firm operations when a firm is 
run by a family. On the other hand, altruism makes agency problems within family 
companies more difficult. The agency costs associated with the conflicts between 
ownership and management, as well as those engendered by altruism, which is deemed as 
a motivation since it can simultaneously satisfy both "altruistic preferences" and 
"egotistic preferences" (Lunati, 1997), negatively affect the performance of family 
controlled companies. 
2.5 Founder-CEOs, descendant-CEOs, and professional CEOs 
Except for the combination of ownership and management, the succession of family 
member-CEOs by other family members is another notable characteristic of family 
companies. Recent research indicates that most family companies around the world are 
operated by family members, either via the original founders or their descendants (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Morck et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
From a theoretical prospective, the influence of family-CEOs on firm performance is 
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unclear (Donnelley, 1964). On one hand, family managers could perform better since 
they are motivated not only by monetary incentives but also by non-monetary incentives, 
which are unique to family managers, such as the reputation of the family (Kandel and 
Lazear, 1992; Davis et al., 1997). They also have more firm specific knowledge and are 
enjoy a higher level of trust by shareholders than outside CEOs. Moreover, they tend to 
concentrate on long-run profitability instead of short-run profits (Cadbury, 2000). On the 
other hand, family managers tend to be less competent and less experienced, because they 
are selected from a small pool of managerial talent (Burkart et al., 2003; Perez-Gonzalez, 
2006). 
As discussed above, controlling families have a strong incentive to improve firm 
performance and create firm value, as they align their own interests with those of their 
companies. But the conflicts between large shareholders and minority shareholders are 
more serious in family firms due to their undiversified ownership structure. Moreover, 
the controlling family may employ outside managers or appoint a family member as CEO. 
A family controlled company whose CEO stems from the controlling family loses the 
opportunity to employ a better professional manager who might create more firm value 
than a family member CEO. At the same time, however, companies with professional 
managers have greater agency costs than family member-CEO companies, since in family 
companies, the conflicts between shareholders and management are less than those in 
non-family companies. Hence, family-member managers can either positively or 
negatively affect firm performance. Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) find that when a 
family holds more voting rights and the degree of involvement in the company's 
management is greater, the company is more likely to appoint family successors. 
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Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that founder-CEOs or founder-Chairmen add value to a 
company in that firms with founder-CEOs or Chairmen have the highest average Tobin's 
Q. Firms with descendant-CEOs have the lowest average Tobin's Q, but the difference is 
not significant. 
As Villalonga and Amit (2006) argue, family management may positively affect firm 
performance in that family management may reduce or even eliminate Agency Problem I. 
However, if the outside professional manager is more competent than the family manager, 
such effects are, to some extent, eliminated (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2002; Burkart et al., 
2003). In line with the argument that family management may reduce the cost of Agency 
Problems I, Morck et al. (1988), Palia and Ravid (2002), Adams et al. (2003), and 
Fahlenbrach (2004) find that founder-CEO companies have greater firm value than non-
family companies, as well as descendant-CEO and professional manager operated family 
companies. However, the stock market typically reacts negatively to the appointment of 
family members as managers (Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999; Perez-Gonzalez, 2001). 
They argue that this negative reaction is due to the uncertainty of both outside financiers 
and potential investors towards the management quality of the family successor. Even 
though descendants know the company better than outside professional managers, they 
are generally younger and are deemed less competent. 
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2.5.1 Factors related to family successions 
Some companies may intend to improve firm performance through the appointment of 
a new CEO. Vancil (1987) finds that the appointment of either an insider or a family 
member as CEO has an insignificant effect on improving firm performance, whereas the 
appointment of an outside professional manager creates value. Hence, he argues that a 
professional manager is a better choice as successor than either an insider or a family 
member. In family companies, the controlling family plays an essential role in deciding 
whom to appoint as CEO, however. The controlling family may pursue their own 
interests with the appointment, and are therefore more likely to propose a person who 
shares their interests rather than the interests of outside shareholders. 
2.5.2 Is the appointment of a family member as CEO value-enhancing or value-damaging? 
Whether the appointment of a family member as CEO is a less optimal selection 
compared with the appointment of a professional manager is inconclusive. Some argue 
that the appointment of family members is extensively affected by the entrenchment of 
family ownership. Families tend to maintain their controlling power by appointing 
family members as CEOs or senior managers, thereby ignoring potentially more 
competent outsiders. Accordingly, the appointment is sub-optimal and in turn, damages 
firm value. 
According to Morck et al. (1988), when a family company appoints an insider or 
outsider as a CEO successor, the company is more likely to become the target of a 
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takeover. Family companies with family member CEOs, on the other hand, are less 
likely to be the target of a takeover. Due to the lower takeover probability, minority 
shareholders are more likely to be critical of the appointment. 
Moreover, it is believed that the negative reaction from the stock market towards the 
appointment of family member can be attributed to the uncertainty about the family-CEO 
successor. Generally, family successors are younger than hired managers or insiders and 
are often deemed less experienced and less competent. Also, professional managers or 
insiders are better known by minority shareholders and potential investors due to their 
relatively longer presence in the industry than family successors. 
On the other hand, some argue that there are advantages of family member successors. 
First of all, family members are more concerned about the company's survival than 
outsiders, since the company is passed from generation to generation as a legacy. Also, 
the social status of the family is often aligned with their firms' performance. Second, 
family successors have better knowledge of the company than outsiders due to their long 
standing with the company and its senior management. Furthermore, some family 
members may have been trained to become a successor from a young age already. 
2.6 Empirical findings in previous studies 
The academic literature provides inconclusive findings on the question whether family 
controlled ownership enhances or damages firm value (McConaughy et al., 1998; Maury, 
2006). Morck et al. (1988) find a nonlinear relationship between family ownership and 
20 
firm performance. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that generally, family companies are 
superior to non-family companies in terms of both accounting and market performance, 
which is contrary to the statement that family ownership is detrimental. Specifically, 
they find that family ownership first positively affects firm performance, but reduces firm 
value when family shareholdings increase. Moreover, they state that both young (less 
than 50-year old) and old (more than 50-year old) family companies exhibit superior 
performance over non-family companies. In addition, they find that family companies 
with founder-CEOs have better performance than non-family companies with respect to 
both accounting and market measures. Family companies operated by descendant-CEOs 
have superior operational profitability than non-family companies and outsider-CEOs. 
Similarly, McConnaughy et al. (1998) conclude that family companies in the US are 
more valuable and efficient than non-family companies. Similarly, Maury (2006) finds 
that founding family-controlled companies in Western Europe outperform non-family 
companies. 
In contrast, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find that family companies in Southeast 
Asia underperform their non-family counterparts, due to the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. In addition, family companies are found to be less efficient and less 
valuable than non-family firms in Sweden and Norway (Cornqvist and Nilsson, 2003; 
Barth et al., 2005). 
It is theoretically suggested that professional managers are superior to family members, 
although the agency costs that result from the conflicts between managers and owners are 
more severe. Hence, if the benefits from the avoidance of Agency Problem 1 exceed the 
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losses of failing to appoint superior professional managers, actively managed family 
companies will outperform non-family companies with hired CEOs. 
According to Villalonga and Amit (2006), family companies outperform non-family 
companies when the controlling family actively involves in the management of the 
company, such as present as family member CEO and/or family-Chairman of the board 
of directors, which is similar to the results from Barontini and Caprio (2006) who find a 
higher firm value and better firm performance for founder-controlled companies. Morck 
et al. (1988) find that founders and descendant-CEOs positively affect firm performance 
in companies established less than 50 years ago whereas there is a negative effect on firm 
performance in older companies, which have been incorporated more than 50 years ago, 
due to the relatively higher level of entrenchment. 
Burkart et al. (2003) suggest that professional CEOs are superior. Similarly, 
Bennedsen et al. (2007) find that there is a negative relationship between management 
successions and firm performance around the successions. After the appointment of 
family members as CEOs in family companies, the return on assets decreases by at least 4 
percent. After controlling for firm characteristics, the results are robust. The authors 
argue that the better performance following the appointment of professional managers 
may be due to the changes of ownership structure, rather than better managerial ability or 
experience. Moreover, they find that family companies that are actively operated by 
family members have lower profitability ratios than companies operated by professional 
managers and are more likely to file for bankruptcy or be liquidated. Lane and Jameson 
(1993) find that when family companies are controlled by younger family members, the 
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companies are less likely to employ advertising, and have lower dividend payout ratios. 
There is no significant influence on leverage by family ownership. Yermack (1996) finds 
that family ownership is negatively associated with firm performance by investigating the 
presence of family members on the board of directors. Johnson et al. (1985) find that the 
death of a founder-CEO leads to an increase in stock prices, whereas they find no 
significant relationship between the stock price performance and the status of CEOs in 
family companies. Chung (1992) states that the status of CEOs has no significant effect 
on firm value, which is measured by modified Tobin's Q. However, stock prices decline 
significantly when founders leave the companies, stock prices decline significantly. 
With respect to control-enhancing mechanisms, King and Santor (2008) find that 
Canadian companies are more likely to employ control-enhancing mechanisms, such as 
pyramids and dual-class shares than companies in the US. They report that Canadian 
family companies with single class shares operate indifferently from their family firms 
with dual class shares based on Tobin's Q, but outperform based on ROA. However, 
family companies employing control-enhancing mechanisms underperform family firms 
without such mechanisms based on Tobin's Q, which is consistent with Gompers et al. 
(2007) who argue that the use of control-enhancing mechanisms by family companies 
destroys firm value. 
Finally, Maury (2006) finds that Agency Problem I in family companies is less severe 
than in widely held companies. However, as ownership increases, this benefit disappears. 
Claessens et al. (2002) and Lins (2003) find that the benefits of concentrated ownership 
are offset by the damages caused by the wedge between voting rights and cash-flow 
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rights on firm valuation in East Asian countries, which is supported by the results from 
Cornqvist and Nilsson (2003). 
3. Data 
3.1 How to define family companies? 
As discussed before, there is no clear definition for family companies. Typically, 
family companies are characterized as being controlled and usually managed by the 
founding family (Shanker and Astrachan, 1996; Lansberg, 1999) and passed as a legacy 
from generation to generation (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). In our study, to be identified 
as a family-controlled company, a firm has to meet at least one of the following criteria: 1) 
the founder or the founding family either individually or as a group holds at least 20% or 
more of the outstanding shares and is the largest shareholder; or 2) either the CEO and/or 
the chairman of the board of directors comes from the founding family (Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006). If the company is operated by a family member and the family owns 20% 
or more of the shares outstanding and is the largest shareholder in the company, it is 
deemed an actively managed family company (Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999). 
Companies in which no shareholder owns more than 20% of the outstanding shares are 
referred to as widely held companies or non-family companies (Claessens et al., 2002; 
King and Santor, 2008). 
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3.2 How to define founders? 
We follow the method used by Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Andres (2008) to 
identify founders as those who founded the company or the predecessor of the company 
in case of a change in the legal form and/or the name of the company. If the company 
was founded by more than one person, we follow Andres (2008) to sum the shares across 
all founding families. Furthermore, people who changed the operations of a company 
significantly after acquiring a majority equity stake in the firm and operated it as the CEO 
are also deemed as founders of the company (Andres, 2008). Hence, as noted by 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), for a person to be considered a founder, he/she does not 
necessarily have to be the person who both incorporated the company and took the 
company public. 
To distinguish their study from prior research, Miller et al. (2007) separate "lone 
founder" companies from "family founder" companies. They define "lone founder" 
companies, as those in which a sole founder manages the company as an officer or 
director, or owns 5% or more of the firm's outstanding shares and there are no other 
family members involved in the company. "Family founder" companies are those in 
which not only the founder but also other relatives participate in the management of the 
company either contemporarily or over time. 
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3.3 How to define control-enhancing mechanisms? 
It is typically assumed that control-enhancing mechanisms entitle the controlling 
family to hold excessive voting rights relative to their equity stakes and facilitate the 
maximization of their own utility (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). They classify voting 
structure into four categories: multiple classes of shares, pyramids, cross holdings and 
voting agreements to investigate whether control-enhancing mechanisms create or 
destroy value. They argue that when the family owns shares through one or more 
intermediate entities, such as a trust, fund, foundation, limited partnership, holding firm, 
or any other form of corporation of which the family owns less than 100% of the shares, 
it is referred to as a pyramid. Cross-holdings exist when the company owns shares in a 
corporation that belongs to the family's chain of control in the firm. Voting agreements 
are agreements among shareholders that result in the family holding voting power over a 
larger number of shares than what it owns in forms of its investment power. Multiple 
share classes refer to voting structures in which firms issue two or more classes of shares 
with differential voting rights. Due to data restrictions, in this paper, we only examine 
the use of dual-class shares. If the company issues more than one class of shares and at 
least one class of shares is entitled to vote more than one vote per share, the company is 
deemed to employ a control-enhancing mechanism. 
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3.4 Data sources 
We collected data about significant shareholders and senior management of all Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX) listed companies from the TSX Group Factbook, the annual 
Financial Post Survey of Industrials, the Financial Post Survey of Mines, the Financial 
Post 500, the Canadian Business 500 and the proxy circular on the System for Electronic 
Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR). Ownership data and board of director data 
was obtained via the Osiris database and SEDAR. Financial data was collected from 
Mergent Online, while stock prices were obtained from the Canadian Financial Markets 
Research Centre (CFMRC). Data regarding the use of dual-class shares was retrieved 
from proxy circulars on SEDAR and the Financial Post Survey of Industrials. 
3.5 Sample description 
Our sample consists of companies listed on Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) during any 
year from 1999 to 2007. Following Villalonga and Amit (2006), companies in which the 
founding family holds more than 20% of outstanding shares and is the largest shareholder, 
either individually or as a group, or firms in which the CEO and/or the Chairman of 
board of directors is a family member as family controlled companies. The percentage of 
shares owned by a family is calculated by aggregating across all family members and 
across all classes of outstanding shares (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and across all 
founding families if there is more than one founding family (Andres, 2008). Financial 
services companies and utility companies are excluded from the sample to make this 
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study comparable with other studies (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Miller et al., 2007; King 
and Santor, 2008). 
In order to investigate how family companies differ from non-family companies, we 
follow the matching method used by McConaughy et al. (1998) to select companies with 
the same two-digit SIC code, a similar size (within +/- 25% of sales revenues) and 
without a single shareholder holding more than 20% of shares in the company as 
matching firms1. 
In order to examine whether the use of control-enhancing mechanisms adds value to a 
family company, we use a control-enhancing dummy, which equals one if the company 
issues multiple voting right shares and zero if each share only has a single vote. The 
wedge between ownership stakes and voting rights is defined as the difference between 
total percentage of voting rights owned by the founding family and the total percentage of 
ownership held by the family. 
Furthermore, we compare the board of director name lists and shareholders name lists 
to identify family member CEOs and chairmen of the board of directors, founder-CEOs 
and descendant-CEOs. Board size and the number of family members on the board are 
also collected to examine the extent to which families exert influence on the management. 
' Before we followed the method used by McConaughy et al. (1998) to select matching firms, we also considered an 
alternative matching procedure in which we considered those firms as matching firms that had a market capitalization 
within +/- 25% of the market capitalization of the corresponding family firms, operate in the same industry (i.e. have 
the same two digit SIC code) and have no majority shareholders holding more than 20% of the firm's outstanding 
shares. Because the results we obtained after employing this matching procedure were generally somewhat weaker, we 
chose to report the results for our sales-based matching procedure. 
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Firm age is collected from the company's profile on their own websites or through 
Factiva. 
3.6 Variables 
Definitions and descriptions of the variables used in this paper are provided in Table 1. 
Tobin's Q is calculated as the ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement cost of 
total assets. A firm's market value is calculated as the sum of the book value of total debt 
and the market value of equity. The market value of equity is calculated as the closing 
price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. When a company has multiple 
classes of shares, we add the market value of each class (Nenova, 2003; Zingales, 1994; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). If at least one class of shares is not traded on the market for 
companies with multiple classes of shares, we multiply the total number of shares of all 
classes with the closing price of the tradable class of shares (Gompers et al., 2004; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). With respect to ROA, we employ both net income and 
EBITDA to calculate ROA (King and Santor, 2008; Andres, 2008; Adams et al., 2008). 
As argued by King and Santor (2008), Tobin's Q is a "forward-looking" measurement, 
which is aimed to reflect the market's valuation of the firm's assets relative to book value 
and the company's future growth opportunities. ROA, on the other hand, is typically 
deemed a "backward-looking" measurement of profitability and productivity. However, 
both Tobin's Q and ROA are substantially affected by the accounting principles used by 
the company towards the valuation of intangible assets, fair market value of assets and 
liabilities. 
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*** Insert Table 1 about here *** 
3.7 Data description 
Correlation coefficients between independent variables are provided in Table 2. We 
find that even if there are significant correlations between control-enhancing mechanisms, 
wedge, log of board size, percentage of family members on the board, family-CEO 
dummy, family-Chairman dummy, founder-CEO dummy and descendant-CEO dummy, 
the coefficients are all less than 0.7, which is the typical benchmark beyond which is 
concerned about multicollinearity. 
*** Insert Table 2 about here *** 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for our sample. The univariate comparison of 
family and non-family companies suggests that first of all, family companies are smaller, 
which is consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003) who report that family companies 
have smaller firm size, which is measured by assets, sales or the number of employees. 
King and Santor (2008) who examine 613 Canadian companies find that family owned 
firms have similar firm size, which is measured by market capitalization, to widely held 
firms. Second, we find that family firms have higher leverage and a lower sales growth 
rate, which is consistent with King and Santor (2008). Third, family firms are older than 
their non-family counterparts, which is contrary to Anderson and Reeb (2003), who find 
that family firms are younger. Fourth, both Tobin's Q and ROA (measured by net 
income and EBITDA) are higher in family companies, although the difference in Tobin's 
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Q between family companies and non-family companies is not statistically significant. 
Similarly, Villalonga and Amit (2006) note that family companies in the US have a 
higher Tobin's Q than non-family firms and that the difference is even greater for 
industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. King and Santor (2008) report that family companies have 
a higher ROA but lower Tobin's Q than widely held companies, however. 
*** Insert Table 3 about here *** 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) argue that founding families are more likely to use 
control-enhancing mechanisms to secure their controlling power by holding excessive 
voting rights over cash-flow rights. In our sample, there are 21 companies issuing dual-
class shares. Among them, 6 companies are widely held companies, and 15 companies 
are controlled by a founding family. The average percentage of shares outstanding held 
by family companies employing dual-class shares is 40.16%, whereas the average 
percentage of voting rights owned by founding families is 62.59%, representing 22.43% 
of voting rights in excess of cash-flow rights. This supports the view that firms employ 
control-enhancing mechanisms to secure the majority control within the company. Smith 
and Amoako-Adu (1999) show that the family companies in their sample hold on average 
53.52% of total voting rights and 62% of family companies employ control-enhancing 
mechanisms, such as dual class shares. Furthermore, Villalonga and Amit (2006) find 
that more than 50% of family companies in their sample employ control-enhancing 
mechanisms, including dual classes of shares, pyramids, cross holdings, and voting 
agreements. King and Santor (2008) argue that Canadian companies are more likely to 
employ control-enhancing mechanisms than those in the US, and are thus similar to firms 
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in Asia and in Europe, which is consistent with the findings by Gompers et al. (2007). 
They also find that more than half of their sample companies employ control-enhancing 
mechanisms, of which 20% have excessive voting rights over cash-flow rights. 
When investigating whether founder-CEOs and descendant-CEOs are superior to 
professional CEO, in our sample, we find that there are 70 out of 79 family companies 
where CEOs and/or Chairmen of the board of directors are family members. Among 
those 58 are founders. Family companies have an average board size that is similar to 
that of non-family companies. Specifically, boards tend to consist of 10 directors, on 
average, and there are 1.5 directors out of those 10 that come from the founding family. 
Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) argue that when a family has higher ownership stake and 
voting rights, a family company is more likely to appoint a family member successor. In 
our sample, we find that when the family actively participates in the company's 
management, the average number of family members on the board is 1.586, which is 
slightly higher than the average number of family board members for all family 
companies, which is 1.5. 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Family vs. non-family companies 
King and Santor (2008) use a random-effects specification to include both time-
invariant and time-variant variables. They take both random effects and clustered 
standard errors into account and include year dummies to measure the time effects. 
32 
Following Claessens et al. (2002), Villalonga and Amit (2006), King and Santor (2008) 
and Andres (2008), we employ multivariate regressions to examine whether family 
ownership is superior to non-family ownership. The dependent variable, for our purpose, 
is firm performance, which is measured by ROA (based on both net income and EBITDA) 
and Tobin's Q. ROA and Tobin's Q are the most common dependent variables used by 
researchers (see also Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006; King and Santor, 2008; Andres, 2008; Miller et al., 2007; and Adams et 
al., 2008). 
Our main independent variables include a family firm dummy, which equals one when 
the company is controlled by a family and zero otherwise, and ownership percentage, 
which is the percentage of shares owned by the controlling family, either individually or 
as a group. The control variables include the firm's leverage (measured by the firm's 
debt/equity ratio), its sales growth rate and its age, (specifically the natural logarithm of 
the firm's age). Besides those variables discussed above, Miller et al. (2007) also include 
lone founder and management variables, the firm's advertising to sales ratio, R&D to 
sales, new investment in plant and equipment, the volatility of company returns (beta) as 
well as total ownership of outside blockholder whose ownership is greater than 5% as 
control variables. 
To examine the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, we 
establish the following model: 
Y,.= a+ Z^OWN^+^X,,,, +E„ (1) 
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where Yjtis firm value, measured by Tobin's Q and ROA (based either on net income or 
EBITDA). OWNhl and OWNlu are ownership variables, including our family firm 
dummy and ownership percentage. Xml (n = 1... N) are control variables, including the 
firm's leverage, its sales growth rate and the natural logarithm of the firm's age. 
4.2 Control-enhancing mechanisms 
Compared to US companies, Canadian family companies are more likely to employ 
pyramids or dual-class shares than widely held companies (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; 
Gompers et al., 2007; King and Santor, 2008). Such a control-enhancing mechanism is 
aimed to secure and enhance the controlling power held by founding families in that it 
entitles founding families to hold excessive voting rights over cash-flow rights. In order 
to test how control-enhancing mechanisms affect firm performance, an additional 
control-enhancing mechanism dummy variable is used, which identifies whether a firm 
employs dual-class shares or not. Villalonga and Amit (2006) include control-enhancing 
mechanisms in their examination by classifying voting or control structures which 
facilitate the enhancement of the controlling family's voting power into different types: 
multiple classes of shares, pyramids, cross-holdings and voting agreements. In our study, 
in order to examine the effects of control-enhancing mechanisms on firm valuation, the 
following model is used. 
Yi, = a + J ] fi„OWNml + X vnXlvl + SCONT„ + sit (2) 
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where Yjtis firm value, measured by Tobin's Q and ROA (based either on net income or 
EBITDA). OWNul, OWN2il and Xnil (n = 1... N) are as defined above. COOT* is 
control-enhancing mechanism variables, which include control-enhancing mechanism 
dummy variable, which equals one if the company uses dual-class shares and zero 
otherwise. In addition, we include the wedge, which is the difference between the 
percentage of voting rights owned by the family and the percentage of outstanding shares 
held by the controlling family (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). The appearance of such 
difference is attributed to the issuance of multiple voting rights shares. 
4.3 Which agency problem is more costly? 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) estimate the interaction effects of family ownership, 
control-enhancing mechanisms and management on firm performance to examine which 
agency problem is more costly, because it is difficult to measure the effects of agency 
problems directly. They assume that family-CEOs and/or family-chairman of the board 
of directors can eliminate the conflicts between ownership and management, and the 
control-enhancing mechanisms can aggravate the conflicts between majority shareholders 
and minority shareholders. Similar to Villalonga and Amit (2006), we classify family 
companies into four categories to examine how family vs. professional management and 
the use of control-enhancing mechanisms affect firm performance in terms of the two 
agency problems: the conflict between owners and managers and the conflict between 
large and small shareholders. We employ the following four categories to classify our 
sample firms (See also Figure 1): 
35 
I) Family firms with control-enhancing mechanisms and family management (i.e. a 
family CEO) and/or a family Chairman of the board of directors — these firms are 
assumed to experience Agency Problem II. 
II) Family firms with control-enhancing mechanisms but with hired CEOs — these 
firms are assumed to experience both two agency problems. 
III) Family firms without control-enhancing mechanisms but with family member-
CEOs and/or Chairmen of the board of directors — these firms are assumed to 
have neither of the two agency problems. 
IV) Family firms having neither control-enhancing mechanisms nor family-CEOs 
and/or Chairmen of the board of directors — these firms are expected to suffer 
from Agency Problem I. 
Type IV companies are deemed as non-family companies in that they neither have 
family-management nor employ control-enhancing mechanisms, which are the typical 
characteristics of non-family controlled companies(Villalonga and Amit, 2006). We 
employ two dummy variables (family-CEO and control-enhancing mechanisms) and 
compare the average Tobin's Q and ROA and the differences of average Tobin's Q and 
ROA between these four types of companies. 
*** Insert Figure 1 about here *** 
It is assumed that Type III companies have the highest levels of both Tobin's Q and 
ROA because they experience neither Agency Problem I nor Agency Problem 11. On the 
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other hand, companies classified as Type II are expected to have the lowest Tobin's Q 
and ROA, as they encounter both Agency Problem I and Agency Problem II. The mean 
values of Tobin's Q and ROA of Type I and Type IV companies are expected to measure 
which agency cost is more costly. Furthermore, we compare the mean differences among 
these four classes of companies. First, the mean difference between Type I and Type II 
companies is assumed to measure the incremental benefits from relieving a firm that 
experiences both agency problems (a Type II firm) of Agency problem I. Second, the 
difference between the mean values of Type IV companies and Type II companies is 
assumed to proxy for the incremental benefits of relieving a Type II firm from Agency 
Problem II. Third, the difference between the mean values of Type I and Type III 
companies is hypothesized to measure the stand-alone cost of suffering from Agency 
Problem II. Finally, differences in the average Tobin's Q and ROA between Type IV and 
Type III companies serves as a proxy for the stand-alone cost of Agency Problem I. 
4.4 Founder-CEO, descendant-CEO, hired CEO and non-family companies 
Some academics argue that founders and descendants of those founders affect firm 
performance differently (Morck et al., 1988; Perez-Gonzalez, 2001). Smith and 
Amoako-Adu (1999) employ a multinomial logit model and calculate the cumulative 
abnormal return to estimate the likelihood a family company appoints a family CEO 
successor and the impact of family successors on firm valuation by comparing family 
member appointments, non-family insider appointments and outsider appointments in 
actively managed family companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) 
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between 1962 and 1996. They find that when family member appointments are 
announced, stock prices decline. However, they argue that the negative reaction on the 
stock market is not due to investors' suspicion about the managerial ability of the family 
successor, but due to their relatively young age and lack of experience. Barontini and 
Caprio (2006) find that founder CEO managed companies outperform non-family 
companies, while the performance of descendant CEO companies is not statistically 
different from that of non-family companies. 
In order to examine whether founder-CEOs and descendant-CEOs are superior to 
professional CEOs, Anderson and Reeb (2003) classify family companies into three 
categories: i.e. those with a founder-CEO, a descendant-CEO or a hired CEO. In addition, 
they examine the impact of family member representation on the board of directors. We 
follow their approach by using a founder-CEO dummy, a descendant-CEO dummy, a 
family-CEO dummy and a family-chairman dummy, which are designed to distinguish 
between family CEOs, including both founder-CEOs and descendant-CEOs, and family 
chairman of the board of directors from professional CEOs. In addition, we examine the 
impact of board size and percentage of family members on the board of directors on firm 
performance. In line with the results from prior studies, we expect family firms that are 
managed by founders to display superior firm performance (proxied for by Tobin's Q). 
We expect that founder-CEOs are superior to descendant-CEOs and professional CEOs. 
The effects of family-CEO and family-Chairman can be either positive or negative, 
however. This is because on one hand, owner-managers can alleviate or even eliminate 
Agency Problem 1. On the other hand, the conflicts between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders will be more serious. The following model is used to measure 
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whether family member CEOs (and/or family member chairmen of the board of directors) 
create or destroy values for a company: 
Yi.= a + I PmOWNm„ +f>„X„„ +SCONTu+fi8pCEO/BOD-StatuspU + e,-, (3) 
where Yjtis firm value, measured by Tobin's Q and ROA (based either on net income or 
EBITDA). Our collection of CEO I BOD - Status variables include a board size variable, 
measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of directors on the board, a family-
CEO dummy variable, which equals one if the CEO comes from the founding family and 
zero otherwise, a family-Chairman dummy, which equals one if the Chairman of the 
board of directors comes from the founding family and zero otherwise, a founder-CEO 
dummy, which equals one if the CEO is the founder of the company and zero otherwise, 
a descendant-CEO, which equals one if the CEO is a descendant of the founder and zero 
otherwise, as well as the percentage of family members on the board, measured as the 
ratio of the number of family member directors to the total number of directors on the 
board. OWNhl, OWN2il, X„„ (n = 1... N) and CONT,, are as defined above. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Family vs. non-family companies 
Our regression results for model (1) are shown in Table 4. Our findings suggest that 
based on Tobin's Q, family companies are superior to non-family companies. When 
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considering ROA, on the other hand, we find no significant difference between family 
and non-family controlled firms. Overall, our results are largely consistent with 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Andres (2008). Andres (2008), for example, reports that 
family companies outperform non-family companies based on both Tobin's Q and ROA. 
As noted, our findings only confirm the first finding. On the other hand, King and Santor 
(2008) find that family firms underperform non-family firms based on Tobin's Q, but 
outperform based on ROA. 
*** Insert Table 4 about here *** 
Moreover, when family ownership percentage increases, Tobin's Q decreases. The 
decrease is significant at the 10% level, which is consistent with Maury (2006). He finds 
that as ownership increases, the benefits from releasing a firm of Agency Problem I 
disappears. Similarly, Anderson and Reeb (2003) state that family ownership positively 
relates to firm value, but when family shareholdings increase, firm value is reduced. In 
contrast, Villalonga and Amit (2006) find a significant positive influence of family 
ownership percentage on Tobin's Q. We find that there is no significant relationship 
between family ownership percentage and ROA. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 42, both leverage and firm age are significantly 
negatively associated with Tobin's Q, while firm age is positively correlated with ROA 
measured by both net income and EBITDA. This is somewhat supportive of King and 
- When we include firm size as an additional control variable in our regressions for Model 1. we find that firm size 
significantly positively affects both Tobin's Q and ROA. Moreover, the family firm dummy becomes significant in 
both ROA regressions. However, our variable that measures family ownership loses its significance in our Tobin's 0 
regression. The significance and signs of leverage, sales growth rate and firm age are unchanged. 
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Santor (2008) who find a positive relationship between firm size, growth rate and ROA, 
whereas leverage negatively affects a firm's accounting profitability. When Miller et al. 
(2007) divide family companies into two categories: "lone founder" companies and 
family businesses, they find that firm performance measured by Tobin's Q is highly 
sensitive to the definition of a family company. Only "lone founder" firms outperform 
widely held companies. 
5.2 Control-enhancing mechanism 
In order to measure the effect of employing a control-enhancing mechanism such as 
dual-class shares, we first run the regression for model (2) for the full sample. In a second 
step, we then divide all samples firms into two subsamples: companies employing dual-
class shares and companies not using dual-class shares. The results are shown in Panel A, 
B, and C of Table 5, respectively. 
*** Insert Table 5 about here *** 
In Panel A, the significance and signs on the coefficients of both our family firm 
dummy and our ownership percentage variables remain the same as the results of model 
(1) shown in Table 4. The coefficients on the control-enhancing mechanism dummy are 
positive and significant when considering either Tobin's Q or ROA. This implies that 
there is a value premium of using control-enhancing mechanisms, which is contrary to 
the findings of Claessens et al. (2002). Villalonga and Amit (2006), Gompers et al. (2007) 
and King and Santor (2008). They find that control-enhancing mechanisms destroy firm 
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value in that the use of control-enhancing mechanisms is generally negatively correlated 
to firm performance. 
Moreover, we find an insignificant influence of the wedge between voting rights and 
equity stakes on firm performance, which is partly consistent with King and Santor 
(2008). They find that both wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights and 
control-enhancing mechanisms insignificantly affect ROA. However, the wedge and the 
use of dual-class shares are negatively associated with Tobin's Q. According to the 
results of Villalonga and Amit (2006), excessive voting rights over cash-flow rights 
negatively affect both a firm's Tobin's Q and its industry-adjusted Q, which is consistent 
with Gompers et al. (2004), Gompers et al. (2007). Gompers et al. (2004) find that when 
dual-class shares produce excessive voting rights over cash-flow rights, firm value 
decreases. Gompers et al. (2007) find that the wedge, which is defined as the difference 
between family shareholders' voting rights and their equity stakes, has a negative impact 
on the median value of Tobin's Q but note that the degree and significance vary 
depending on the estimation methods. In addition, we find a firm's sales growth rate 
does not appear to have any significant effects on firm performance. Leverage negatively 
affects Tobin's Q and has no significant influence on ROA. Firm age is significantly 
negatively associated with Tobin's Q, but the sign is different when considering ROA 
instead. This supports earlier findings by King and Santor (2008), although the 
coefficients are not statistically significant in their study. Similar to our results, they find 
that firm age is negatively correlated with Tobin's Q, but positively correlated with ROA. 
42 
In Panel B of Table 5, we provide the regression results for model (2) for companies 
employing control-enhancing mechanisms. Family companies outperform based on 
Tobin's Q and underperform based on ROA, based on either net income or EBITDA. 
When families hold higher ownership stakes, Tobin's Q decreases, whereas ROA 
increases. The difference between voting rights and cash-flow rights becomes significant 
in both our Tobin's Q and ROA regressions. On the other hand, leverage becomes 
significant in our ROA regression, but loses its significance in the Tobin's Q regression 
when compared with the results in Panel A. Our results for firm age are consistent with 
those in Panel A. Even though control-enhancing mechanisms appear to add value to the 
company, excessive voting rights over cash-flow rights decrease Tobin's Q. Interestingly, 
the wedge in Panel A is negative and insignificant on ROA. However, it becomes 
significant and positive in Panel B. The greater the excessive voting rights held by 
controlling family, the higher the level of ROA produced by a given firm. The results in 
Panel C are highly similar to the results in Panel A. 
Compared to most other studies in the literature, our results are somewhat 
contradictory with respect to the influence of control-enhancing mechanisms on firm 
value. While our findings suggest that control-enhancing mechanisms create value, prior 
research generally finds that the use of control-enhancing mechanisms destroys firm 
value. Our findings may be sample-specific and unique to Canada. In Canada, both the 
local and federal government have been known to provide support to large family 
companies such as Bombardier when they undergo difficult times - a practice that is 
rather rare in the US. Such government aid programs are undoubtedly beneficial for 
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shareholders, including family shareholders. However, when these same firms do well, 
there is typically no payback to the government, meaning that shareholders benefit again. 
This provides many Canadian firms in the past with a sort of call option that protects 
them from failure on the downside but grants them the full upside potential during 
favorable times. This protection may also prompt family shareholders to issue dual-class 
shares to secure their controlling power within the company and allows them to further 
benefit from having excessive control rights over cash-flow rights. 
5.3 Agency problems 
As discussed above, in order to estimate which agency problem is more costly, we 
follow Villalonga and Amit (2006) and classify family companies in our sample into four 
categories. There are fourteen Type 1 companies, one Type II company, fifty-six Type 111 
companies and eight Type IV companies. The results are shown in Table 63. Opposite to 
our expectation that Type III would have the highest levels of Tobin's Q and ROA 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006), Type I firms have the highest level of Tobin's Q and ROA. 
At the same time, we find that Type II firms have the lowest levels of Tobin's Q, which is 
consistent with our expectation, and Type IV companies produce lowest level of ROA. 
*** Insert Table 6 about here *** 
Note that given the small size of some of our subsamples (particularly the Type II companies), the results presented 
have should be viewed with some caution. 
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Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that companies that have no agency problems, have 
the highest average Tobin's Q and average industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. However, our 
results suggest that firms classified as Type I, i.e. those with a control-enhancing 
mechanism and a family-CEO and/or a family-chairman of the board of directors, 
generate higher levels of both Tobin's Q and ROA than those in Type IV companies, 
which indicates that companies with Agency Problem II may be better off than 
companies encountering Agency Problem I. Second, the differences of both Tobin's Q 
and ROA between Type I and Type III companies are assumed to measure the cost of 
experiencing Agency Problem II and differences between Type IV and Type III are 
supposed to measure the cost of Agency Problem I. They are all supposed to be negative, 
because companies with neither Agency Problem I nor Agency Problem II are assumed 
to generate the highest levels of Tobin's Q and ROA. However, as shown in Table 6, the 
differences are positive, which is contrary to our expectations. Third, the difference 
between Type I and Type II companies, which is 0.254, proxies for the benefits of 
relieving a firm of Agency Problem I. Interestingly, this figure is greater than the 
difference between Type IV and Type II companies, which is 0.135, and measures the 
benefits generated from the avoidance of Agency Problem II, based on Tobin's Q. 
Although we were unable to test for the significant of the difference between those two 
type-changes, our results appear to suggest that Agency Problem I is more costly than 
Agency Problem II, which is in contrast with Villalonga and Amit (2006). They find that 
the use of control-enhancing mechanism destroys firm value, and minority shareholders 
are neither better nor worse off than they would have been in a non-family company due 
to the benefits of family ownership. In summary, our results suggest that control-
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enhancing mechanism adds value to the firm, which is consistent with the finding for 
model (2), and Agency Problem 1, the conflict between owner and management, is more 
costly than the conflict between majority and minority shareholders, namely Agency 
Problem II. 
5.4 Founder-CEOs and descendant-CEOs 
The results for model (3) are shown in Table 7. After controlling for the control 
exerted over managers by the founding family, the family dummy becomes significant 
based on both Tobin's Q and ROA, even if the signs are different. Family companies are 
better off based on Tobin's Q, which is consistent with Anderson and Reeb (2003), 
Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Miller et al. (2007), and worse off based on ROA. On 
one hand, our control-enhancing dummy variable remains positive and significant in our 
Tobin's Q regression. On the other hand, when the excessive voting rights over cash-
flow rights become greater, Tobin's Q decreases significantly. Moreover, larger board 
size generates a higher level of ROA but has no influence on Tobin's Q. When there is 
more family members presented on the board of directors, Tobin's Q decreases 
dramatically. According to Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999), the number of family 
officers and directors has a strong positive effect on the likelihood of family successor 
appointments. However, the cumulative abnormal return surrounding the announcement 
of a successor is negative when the company appoints either a family member or a non-
family member insider. With respect to long-run performance, they find that the median 
industry-adjusted ROA decreases significantly in firms managed by family successors, 
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whereas the median industry-adjusted ROA in firms with outside successors increase 
significantly. On the other hand, they find no significant relationship between non-family 
insider successors and firm performance. 
*** Insert Table 7 about here *** 
Furthermore, family-CEOs are better managers based on ROA while family-Chairmen 
destroy firm value proxied for by Tobin's Q. With respect to the generation of CEO 
and/or the Chairman of the board of directors, we find that founder-CEOs are better 
managers, measured by Tobin's Q, than descendant-CEOs. Moreover, ROA is 
significantly lower when the firm is operated by a descendant-CEO, which is consistent 
with Villalonga and Amit (2006). Similarly, Andres (2008) finds that founder-CEOs are 
better than both descendant-CEOs and professional CEOs in family controlled companies, 
even though they are superior to CEOs in non-family companies. Adams et al. (2008) 
find that founder-CEOs add value to companies, based on both Tobin's Q and ROA. In 
contrast, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) find that descendant-CEOs are as successful as 
founder-CEOs, based on ROA. Miller et al. (2007) find that when "lone founder" 
companies are separated from family businesses, "lone founder" companies have a higher 




We find that family companies are superior to non-family based on Tobin's Q, even 
though when the proportion of family ownership increases, firm value decreases. In our 
multivariate analysis, we find that the coefficients of many of our explanatory variables, 
such as firm age, have opposing signs in our on Tobin's Q and ROA regressions. Some 
of these differences can likely be attributed to the different characteristics of Tobin's Q 
and ROA. For example, it is often argued that Tobin's Q is a "forward-looking" 
measurement of firm value and that ROA is a "backward-looking" measurement of a 
firm's profitability and productivity. As such, Tobin's Q also proxies for a firm's future 
growth opportunities. Thus, when a firm is older, its future growth opportunities tend to 
be smaller, leading to a negative relationship between firm age and Tobin's Q. 
Moreover, family companies are more likely to employ control-enhancing 
mechanisms such as dual-class shares than non-family companies, which is consistent 
with Villalonga and Amit (2006), Gompers et al. (2007), and King and Santor (2008). 
Control-enhancing mechanisms are positively associated with both Tobin's Q and ROA, 
even though the more excessive the voting rights over cash-flow rights are, the lower the 
Tobin's Q is. 
To shine some light on the different types of agency problems that frequently affect 
firms and on their respective costs, we follow Villalonga and Amit (2006) and divide 
family companies into four categories and compare the mean value of Tobin' Q and ROA 
between these categories to measure which agency problem is more costly. We find that 
firms experiencing Agency Problem II have the highest average Tobin's Q and ROA, 
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which confirms our results of model (2) that suggested that control-enhancing 
mechanisms add value to the company. Moreover, we conclude that conflicts between 
owners and management are more costly than conflicts between majority and minority 
shareholders. This suggests that the expropriation of minority shareholders by majority 
shareholders is compensated for by the benefits of family ownership. 
Finally, as Andres (2008) suggests, family companies outperform non-family 
companies and this outperformance relates to the role the family plays in the company 
and the degree of the family's involvement in the management. As discussed above, 
firms with family-CEOs are superior to firms with professional CEOs based on ROA. 
Yet, family-Chairmen and family officers / directors significantly negatively affect a 
firm's Tobin's Q. Consistent with prior studies (Morck et al., 1988; Palia and Ravid, 
2002; Adams et al., 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2004; and Andres, 2008), we find that firms with 
founder-CEOs are better off than firm's with descendant-CEOs. We argue that the 
superior firm performance of family firms can be attributed to the active representation of 
family members in managerial positions. When the founder serves as a CEO in the 
company, the superior performance is found to be strongest. 
In addition to the agency costs I discussed in this paper, there are other types of 
agency costs that may affect firm performance, such as the agency costs between family 
firm and its creditors and the agency costs between the firm and its employees. For 
example, in order to secure their interests, creditors may require their client to maintain a 
certain level of debt to keep the leverage below a required ratio. On the other hand, the 
company may tend to borrow more money to expand operations and make more profits. 
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Hence, there is conflict between the firm and its creditors that may indirectly also affect 
firm value. In future research in this area, it would be interesting to empirically explore 
how these agency costs affect firm value. 
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Table 1 
Definition of variables 
Variable Definition and/or description 
1. Tobin'sQ 
2. ROA (Net Income) 
3. ROA (EBITDA) 
4. Family firm 
5. Ownership percentage 
6. Leverage 




10. Log of board size 
11. Percentage of family 
members on the board 
Measurement of firm performance 
Tobin's Q = (Book Value of Total Assets - Book Value of 
Shareholders' Equity + Market Value of Shareholders' Equity) 
/ Book Value of Total Assets 
Return on assets = Net Income / Book Value of Total Assets 
Return on assets = EBITDA / Book Value of Total Assets 
Dummy variable which equals one when the company is 
controlled by a family, (i.e. a family is the largest shareholder 
and holds more than 20% of the outstanding shares in the 
company, either individually or as a group or the CEO and/or 
Chairman of the board of directors is family member), and 
zero otherwise 
Ratio of the total number of shares held by the controlling 
family to the total number of shares outstanding 
The firm's debt-to-equity ratio 
The firm's annual sales growth rate 
Dummy variable which equals one if the company employs 
dual-class shares resulting in the violation of the one-share-
one-vote principle. 
Difference between the percentage of ownership stakes held 
by the family and the percentage of voting rights owned by the 
family 
Natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board 
Ratio of the number of family member directors to the total 
number of directors on the board. It measures the power or 
the influence of the family on the board 
12. Log of firm age Natural logarithm of the firm's age 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Variable Definition and/or description 
13. Family-CEO dummy Dummy variable which equals one if the CEO comes from 
the founding family, and zero otherwise 
14. Family-Chairman Dummy variable which equals one if the Chairman of Board 
dummy of directors is family member, and zero otherwise 
15. Founder-CEO dummy Dummy variable which equals one if the CEO of the 
company is the founder, and zero otherwise 
16. Descendant-CEO Dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is a 
dummy descendant of the founder, and zero otherwise 




Family Ownership Leverage Sales Control- Wedge 




Leverage 0.07630* 0.00692 
Sales -0.07191 -0.01764 -0.00335 
growth 
Control- 0.17255*** -0.00503 0.06081 -0.05346 
enhancing 
mechanism 
Wedge 0.16696*** -0.01573 0.06232 -0.03475 0.67801*** 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Log of Percentage Log of firm Family-





Chairman CEO CEO 





Log of firm 0.00227 0.00211 
age 
Family- 0.59117*** 0.67758*** 0.00177 
CEO 
dummy 
Family- 0.63258*** 0.53957*** 0.00184 
Chairman 
dummy 
Founder- 0.63444*** 0.65707*** 0.00167 
CEO 
dummy 





0.38417*** 0.35551*** 0.01375 
The table presents the correlation coefficients between independent variables. The definitions of 
independent variables are provided in Table 1. Statistical significance is denoted at the 1% (***), 
5% (**) or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Univariate comparison of Family firms and non-family firms 
Variables 
Tobin's Q 






Firm age (yrs) 
Wedge 
Log of board size 
Percentage of family 






































































































This table presents means, standard deviations and tests of differences between family companies 
and non-family companies with respect to their firm performance, ownership, control-enhancing 
mechanisms, family's control power on the Board and generations of CEOs. Family firms are 
defined as those where the founding family is the largest shareholder and holds more than 20% of 
outstanding shares, either individually or as a group, or the CEO and/or Chairman of the board of 
directors is a family member. Statistical significance is denoted at the 1% (***), 5% (**) or 10% 
(*) level, respectively. 
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Table 4 







































This table provides the results of multivariate regressions on Tobin's Q, ROA (net income) and 
ROA (EBITDA) on a series of explanatory variables. There are a total of 173 companies in our 
sample, 79 firms are controlled by family and 94 are widely held companies. Tobin's Q is 
defined as the ratio of a firm's market value of total assets to the replacement cost of total assets. 
Family firm is a dummy variable, which equals one if founding family holds at least 20% of total 
outstanding shares and is the largest shareholder, individually or as a group, or the CEO and/or 
Chairman of the board of directors is a family member, and zero otherwise. Family percentage is 
the percentage of shares held by the founding family. Leverage is the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. 
Sales growth is the firm's annual sales growth rate. Log of firm age is the natural logarithm of 
firm age. T-values are provided in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Regression of firm performance on family ownership after controlling for control-enhancing 
mechanisms 
Panel A: All companies [173] 
Tobin's Q Return on Assets Return on Assets 















-0.180 (-5.29)*** -0.1334 (-3.81)*** 
-0.001 (-0.06) 0.011(0.66) 






















Table 5 (continued) 











































Table 5 (continued) 
Panel C: Companies not using dual-class shares[152] 
Tobin's Q Return on Assets 
(Net Income) 







Log of firm age 
R-square 
Adjusted R-sq 






















This table provides the results of multivariate regressions on Tobin's Q, ROA (net income) and 
ROA (EBITDA) on a series of explanatory variables. Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of a firm's 
market value of total assets to the replacement cost of total assets. Family firm is a dummy 
variable, which equals one if founding family holds at least 20% of total outstanding shares and is 
the largest shareholder, individually or as a group, or the CEO and/or Chairman of the board of 
directors is a family member, and zero otherwise. Family percentage is the percentage of shares 
held by the founding family. Leverage is the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. Sales growth is the 
firm's annual sales growth rate. Log of firm age is the natural logarithm of firm age. In order to 
measure the effect of control-enhancing mechanism, dual-class shares, on firm performance, 
control-enhancing dummy and difference variables are used. Control-enhancing dummy equals 
one, if the company issues multiple classes shares, which lead to any wedge between voting 
rights held by the family and equity stakes owned by the family. Wedge is the difference 
between total voting rights held by the family and total equity stakes owned by the family. T-
values are provided in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% 
(**) and 10% (*) level, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Agency problem results 
Type I firms 
Mean Std Dev 
[14] 
Type II firms 
















Type HI firms 
Mean Std Dev 
[56] 
Type IV firms 















Differences (t-stats) (I)-(III) (rv)-(ii) (I)-(IV) 
Tobin's Q 











The table presents the mean values and standard deviations of Tobin's Q and ROA measured by 
net income and EBITDA of Type I, II, III and IV companies. Type I companies are family firms 
with control-enhancing mechanisms and family CEOs and/or family Chairman of the board of 
directors. Those firms are assumed to experience Agency problem II. Type II firms are family 
firms with control-enhancing mechanisms but with hired CEOs and are assumed to experience 
both of the two agency problems. Family firms without control-enhancing mechanisms and with 
family member-CEOs and/or family Chairman of the board of directors are Type III companies 
and are assumed to experience neither of the two agency problems. Type IV companies are 
family firms that have neither control-enhancing mechanisms nor family-CEOs and/or family 
Chairman of the board of directors. They are expected to suffer from Agency problem I. The 
table also includes the differences and t-values between firms in those four categories. T-values 
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are provided in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) 
and 10% (*) level, respectively. 
Table 7 
Regression of firm value on family ownership after controlling for the active management by 
founding families 
Tobin's Q Return on Asset 
(net income) 








Log of board size 
Percentage of family 

























































This table demonstrates results of multivariate regressions on Tobin's Q, ROA (net income) and 
ROA (EBITDA). There are a total of 173 companies in our sample, 79 firms are controlled by 
family and 94 are widely held companies. Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of a firm's market 
value of total assets to the replacement cost of total assets. Family firm is a dummy variable. 
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which equals one if founding family holds at least 20% of total outstanding shares and is the 
largest shareholder, individually or as a group, or the CEO and/or Chairman of the board of 
directors is a family member, and zero otherwise. Family percentage is the percentage of shares 
held by the founding family. Leverage is the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. Sales growth is the 
firm's annual sales growth rate. Log of firm age is the natural logarithm of firm age. Control-
enhancing dummy equals one, if the company issues multiple classes shares, which lead to any 
wedge between voting rights held by the family and equity stakes owned by the family. Wedge is 
the difference between total voting rights held by the family and total equity stakes owned by the 
family. In order to examine the effects of the degree of founding family's managerial control on 
the company and the effects of generation, the following variables are employed. Log of board 
size is the natural logarithm of total number of board directors. Family-CEO dummy variable 
equals one if the firm's CEO is family member, either founder or descendant and is zero 
otherwise. Family-Chairman dummy variable is one if the Chairman of Board of directors is 
family member, and is zero otherwise. Founder-CEO dummy variable equals one if the CEO is 
the firm's founder and is zero otherwise. Descendant-CEO dummy variable equals one if the 
CEO is descendant of the founding family. Percentage of family members on the board is the 
percentage of family member director on the board of directors. T-values are provided in 






Type I: [14] 
Family firms with control-enhancing 
mechanisms and family CEOs and/or 
a family Chairman of the board of 
directors 
Type III: [56] 
Family firms without control-enhancing 
mechanisms but with family member-
CEOs and/or a family Chairman of the 
board of directors 
Type II: [1] 
Family firms with control-enhancing 
mechanisms but with hired CEOs 
Type IV: [8] 
Family firms having neither control-enhancing 
mechanism nor family-CEOs and/or a family 
Chairman of the board of directors 
• 
Weak Agency problem I Strong 
This graph presents 4 types of family companies, which encounter either Agency Problem I or II, 
both of them, or neither of them. Type I companies are assumed to experience Agency Problem 
II. Type II companies are assumed to experience both Agency Problem I and Agency Problem II. 
Type III companies are assumed to experience neither of them, while Type IV companies are 
assumed to experience Agency Problem I. 
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